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THE NEW FEDERAL RULES AND STATE PRO-
CEDURE
Obvious Advantages of Uniform System in State and Federal Courts Call for Serious Consid-
eration of Possibility of State Adoption of. Federal Rules-Such Adoption Would Not Result in
Serious Disruption of Existing Procedure in the Substantial Majority of States Which Now
Have a So-called Code Procedure-Comparison with Varying State Rules Shows That, Quite
Apart from Considerations of Uniformity, the Merits of a Given Situation Are Largely in Fa-
vor of the Federal Rules etc.
By BERNARD C. GAVIT
Dean of the Indiana University School of Law
HE obvious advantages of a uniform system ofprocedure in the Federal and State courts call for
serious consideration of the possibility of a State
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Al-
ready there is something of a movement in this direc-
tion.' In view of the fact that a substantial majority
of the States have now adopted a so-called Code pro-
cedure there exists a basis for a comparison of the
Federal Rules with Code procedure in its general form.
It is believed that it can be demonstrated that the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules would not result in a serious
disruption of existing procedure in a so-called Code
state.
The basic New York act has been extensively
copied only in so far as it deals with the subject mat-
ter of pleading and when one speaks of Code proce-
dure the pleading aspect of procedure would usually
be the only one in mind. The Federal Rules include
also the subjects of the service of process and papers,
trial practice, evidence, depositions and discovery, and
also appellate procedure. In all of those fields one
finds considerable variation in detail among the States.
It is true, nevertheless, that there is a common basic
common law and equity background (except of course
in Louisiana) and a general similarity of statutory re-
form, so that the variations are largely as to detail
and not as to general form. The consideration of uni-
formity between the Federal and the State rules in
those fields is as pertinent as it is in the field of plead-
ing. On the face of it the States could very well give
up local peculiarities in those fields in order to achieve
complete uniformity.
If one compares the Federal Rules on those sub-
jects with the varying State Rules it will be found that
quite apart from the consideration of uniformity the
merits of a given situation are largely in favor of the
Federal Rules. On most of the more controversial
points the rule finally adopted by the United States
Supreme Court was one which was preferred by a
substantial majority of representative lawyers through-
out the entire country.2  For example, Rule 3 consti-
1. See Mitchell, Uniform State and Federal Practice, 24
A. B. A. J. 981 (1938); Flory & McMahon, The New Federal
Rules and La. Practice, 1 La. L. Rev. 45 (1938); Part II
Third Annual Report, Indiana Judicial Council (1918).
The last publication contains a detailed suggested form revising
the Federal Rules into State rules.
tutes a repudiation of the common law practice as to
the commencement of an action. Under that practice
the declaration was not filed until after a summons
had been issued and served. The Federal Rules oin
the other hand provide for the filing of a complaint
and the immediate service of a copy of the complaint
with the summons. Admitting that the older practice
is workable, one who chooses to defend it on this score
as against the Federal rule is compelled to deny the
judgment of a substantial majority of the lawyers of
the country who expressed a preference for the Fed-
eral Rule in its present form.
The same thing is true as to the provision in Rule
4 (c) as to the service of process. One group of
States has clung to the common law practice and al-
lowed service of process only by an officer. Another
group of States has completely repudiated this prac-
tice and allows service of process by an individual se-
lected by the plaintiff. The Federal Rule has effected
a compromise on the point and provides in general for
service by an officer allowing, however, special appoint-
ments to serve process in the discretion of the court.
Because of the conclusive effect of an officer's return
with the consequent unimpeachable validity of a de-
fault judgment," much can be said in favor of the coin-
mon law rule.
A number of other instances could be cited where
the judgment of the Rules' Committee and the United
States Supreme Court in its choice between conflicting
practices can be sustained on the merits. One can
safely assert that the Federal Rules report the best
of modern opinion on the subject of civil procedure
and would constitute a very desirable reformation in
any State where there was even a substantial variance
between the State practice and the Federal Rules. But
even so it can fairly be said that in a great many in-
stances there is no particular "merit" on either side
of conflicting procedural practices. Frequently one
understandable and settled rule is as good as its oppo-
site. In the interest of uniformity a State could afford
to give up an established practice without substantial
loss.
It is believed, however, that even so the rules on
pleading are the ones which will cause the most con-
2. Hearings Before House Committee, p. 16.
3. Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236 (1914).
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cern to many lawyers. It is the purpose, therefore, of
this article to undertake to demonstrate that funda-
mentally the Federal Rules do not depart from the Code
procedure and that the changes in detail which would
he effected are extremely desirable.
Several of the basic concepts of pleading devel-
opedt under the common law system have been retained
tinder the Code. Tile Code accepted the common law
doctrine which imposed an obligation on the parties to
an action to produce by written pleadings issues to be
decided by the court. While the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure give the trial judge an opportunity
to control the action of the parties during the pleading
stage of a proceeding they nevertheless accept the phi-
losophy that the function of pleading is to produce
from the written statement of the parties the issues
to he disposed of in a given case.
The Code repudiated the common law doctrine
1hat a judgment could only he based upon and in con-
fornfity to good pleadings. There has long been rather
common agreement that excommunication and death as
penalties for the violation of procedural rules were too
severe and were unjust to the litigant. Liberal pro-
vision has been made for the amendment of pleadings
and the disregard of procedural defects in the final
dispositimi of a case.4 The Federal Rules have ac-
cepted the philosophy of the Code on this subject and
make liberal provisions on the subiects of amendments
and the disregard of procedural defects.5
Code pleading also repudiated the common law
doctrine of the singleness of the issue and allowed a
party to plead over after an adverse ruling on a de-
murrer and further allowed the pleading of inconsis-
tent defenses.' The Federal Rules contain restrictions
upon those subiects but in general follow the code
practice.1 The Code initiated a common procedure
for actions at common law and suits in equity and the
Federal Rules accomplish this same result.
The Code repudiated some of the specific rules of
common law pleading such, for example, as the rule
of strict construction against a pleader and the plead-
ing of fictions.8  This same result is reached under
the Federal Rules. On the other hand in the adminis-
tration of the Code a good many' common law prece-
dents were accepted as controlling. Thus. for ex-
ample, the dividing line between a prima facie case
and an affirmative defense was determined almost en-
tirelv in the light of the common law cases on this
subject. In general the Federal Rules reach the same
result.'
In the field of procedural techniques those devel-
oped under the common law and equity systems were
retained tinder the Code and have been retained by
the Federal Rules despite the fact that in some in-
stances the name has been changed. Thus the avail-
able motions, objections, pleas, and demurrers remain
to a considerable extent what they have always been.
Under all three systems there is a common recognition
of the proposition that a proper procedural device is
provided as to all possible questions and that the ac-
cepted device must be followed in order to raise the
point sought to be raised. Thus, for example, under
the Code an answer in abatement or motion to dis-
4. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 492-522.
5. Rules 15 and 61.
6. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 365-367: 432-435.
7. Rule 8 (e).
8. Clark, Code Pleading (1928). pp. 238-240; Pomeroy's
Code Remedies (5th Ed. 1929) p. 500.
9. Rule 8 (c) ; Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 415-426.
miss was quite similar to the common law plea in
abatement, the demurrer was quite similar under both
systems, and the motion for a new trial was quite
similar. Because of provisions in the Code which were
at variance with common law rules 0 the courts devel-
oped a motion to make more specific, a motion to strike
out, a motion for a bill of particulars, and a motion
to separate. All of these are retained in the Federal
Rules and their functions are to all practical purposes
identical with their functions under the Code.
Thus while Rule 7 (c) abolishes demurrers, pleas,
and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading Rule 12
(b) (c) and (h) makes provision for appropriate mo-
tions and answers in lieu of an answer in abatement or
a demurrer. Under Code procedure questions of venue.
jurisdiction of the person, the service of process, the
sufficiency of the service of process were normally
raised by demurrer or an answer in abatement, an af-
firmative answer or a motion to quash." Under the
Federal Rules the proper procedure is a motion to dis-
miss or a motion to quash. The question of the pen-
dency of another action upon the same claim between
the same parties which normally had to be raised by
an answer in abatement may now certainly be raised
by a motion to dismiss. There can be no misjoinder
of actions under the Federal Rule so that necessarily
the demurrer for misjoinder of actions needs no
counterpart in the Federal procedure. The demurrer
for misjoinder or defect of parties is superseded by
Rule 21 the proper motion being for the dropping or
adding of parties. The question of capacity to sue or
be sued normally has to be raised by answer in abate-
ment tinder the Code' 2 and this is the practical result
tinder Federal Rule 9 (a).
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter could
previously be raised by plea in abatement, motion to
dismiss, or demurrer. Rule 12 (b) requires that it
he raised by motion to dismiss or answer. Rule 12
(b) specifically allows the joinder of answers in abate-
ments (or for dismissal) with answers on the merits.
Some of the code States had similarly repudiated the
common law on the subject while others had retained
it."
Rule 12 (g) providing for the consolidation of
motions will constitute an innovation in a good man'
states. In substance the rule requires all motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, motions to make
more specific, motions to strike out, and motions to
separate to be filed at the same time, thus avoiding
the delays permitted where this is not required.
Rule 12 (h) on the waiver of defenses in one re-
spect goes further than the usual Code provision and
in another respect does not go as far as some Code
provisions. Some States have provided that a failure
to demur for insufficient facts constitutes a waiver of
that question.' 4 It has been held, however, that such
a provision simply permits a party to prove what he
has alleged and the question of the sufficiency in law
of the alleved claim or defense under the proof is still
open." There seems to be no good reason why a
10. The common law demurrer raised both questions of
form and substance. The demurrer tinder the code prescribed
miatters which might be properly raised by a demurrer to the
exclusion of all other matters with the result that some matters
which might previously have been raised by a demurrer had
to be raised by a motion. See, Clark, Code Pleading (1928).
pp. 340-348; 374-381.
11. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 344-356; 410-414.
12. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 222-225; 156; 412.
13. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 410-412.
14. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 368-370.
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party should as a matter of course be permitted to
prove what lie has alleged if the proof would as a
matter of law be Insufficient.
The usual provision as to jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter has been that the failure to raise the ques-
tion by plea in abatement, motion, or demurrer (lid not
waive the question."5 It will be observed that Rule 12
(It ) does provide for a waiver so far as the parties are
concerned but not so far as the court is concerned. It
further provides that defective allegations oti the sutb-
jct may be cured by the evidence. This Rule provides
Ihat a party may "suggest" the lack of jurisdiction
but it seems clear that the failure or the refusal of a
court to accept a "suiggoestion" does not constitute re-
versible error. There is abundant authority for the
proposition that parties may waive the question of
jurisdiction of the subject matter if it has not been
raised prior to judgment and there is no good reason
why provision ought not to be made for waiver at an
earlier date.'; Clearly it is one objection which in
fairness ought to be raised at the very beginning of
the case. 7 Those who insist upon the conmmnon dogma
to the effect that parties may not confer jurisdiction
of the subject matter of an action on a court b con-
sent or waiver will find that an investigation of the
cases results in a repudiation of that dogita. One
can find altost innumerable cases where courts have
held that the question may not be raised in a collateral
proceeding.",
So far as the form of allegations in a pleading is
concerned the Federal Rules effect a desirable repildia-
tion of the usual interpretation of the Code provision
on the subject. To some extent the result might be
termed a reversion to the common law practice. While
literally of course the latter statement is not true be-
cause the common law practice actually varied from
a general rule that a party was to plead according to
legal effect to a rule which permitted the pleadings of
fictions in some instances, conformity to an established
forn in other instances, and a rule which required con-
siderable detail in other instances.'8 in general how-
ever it is fair to say the common law practice conten-
plated a rather general statement of the parties' con-
15. Prudential Ins. Co..of Am. v. Ritchey, 188 Ind. 157,
119 N. E. 384 (1918).
16. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 368.
16a. Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 15 8 (1930); Gavit, Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter
and Res Judicata, 80 U. of Pa. 386 (1932); Sec. 450, 451
Am. Law Inst.. Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934).
17. The law of procedure has always insisted that other
preliminary questions of this character such. for example, as
jurisdiction of the person, capacity of the parties, venue, and
the pendencv of another action be asserted and disposed of
at the begiiiing of the proceeding. It is essentially unfair
to allow a defendant to permit the plaintiff to proceed to a
favorable judgment and then raise the question of the iuris-
diction of the court. In view of the fact that the parties may
secure an immediate appellate review of an adverse decision on
this point by the use of a writ of prohibitio or a writ of
mandamus we could well afford to insist not only upon the
defendant raising the question at the earliest opportunity but
also insist that he pursue his immediate remedy for appellate
review and refuse to consider an adverse ruling as reversible
error.
17a. The Federal Courts from the very beginning have
held that while diversity of citizenship goes to the iurisdiction
of the subject matter of at action in the United States District
Courts there may be no collateral attack toomn a judgment on
this score. See, Evers v. Watson. 136 U. S. 527 li895). See
also, articles cited above in Note 16a.
18. Compare for example the accepted forms of com-
plaint at common law in the actions of debt, trover, trespass,
and defamation.
tentions. The Code required a plaintiff however to
state "the facts constituting his cause of action in plain
and concise language" and a defendant to allege "any
new matter constituting a defense" likewise in plain
and concise language. It is fair to say that the fram-
ers of the Code probably contemplated a rather detailed
statement of a party's contention as to the facts in a
form which avoided the use of legal language as sucl.'"
The courts however never consistently administered the
ctde 11ot this basis anh somte cotmon lass fornis ver'
held stifficient under the C'ode' and in s1mte itistatIce.quite clearly the colirts permlitted pleading
" 
accordin-
to the legal effect.t
The Federal Rules requIttir'e t Ii this score that the
complaint contain "a short and plain statettent of tie
claim showing that tie pleader is entitled to relief."
And further that "all averments in a pleading shall be
simple, concise and direct.''2  Those who framed the
new rules sought by the ttse of this new langtage to
avoid the controversy over the meaning of the phrase
"cause of action" and the phrase *'cause of defense"
and further to avoid the Code distinction between alle-
gations which swere in the form of ultimate or opera-
tive facts atd those which were in the form of legal
conclusions. "  It is believed however that on the first
proposition the Federal Rule in substituting the isrd
"claiit'' for the phrase "cause of action" has itl
avtided a problem which is inevitable.
Both the F;ederal Rule and tite Code rule so far
as a cotipiaint is concerned iii sttitance require ai
plaintiff ts allege a situation wlich discloses o n its face
a prima farit legal right of sotte character silhich if
proved would etitle him to an affirniative judgmitnt
against the defendatit. '4  Under Rule 12 (b) a de-
fendant may move to dismiss an action for failure (tf
the complaint to "state a claim upon which relief can
be granted." There is no substantial distinction be-
tween this motion and the demurrer for insufficieit
facts under the Code or the general demurrer at cotn
inon law. The ultimate function of pleading is to pre-
sent to a court a factual background upon which is
based by implication an asserted legal interest of some
character upon which a party is entitled to a judgment
or decree. Inevitably there is a background of stb-
stantive or jurisdictional law involved in every case
and the rules .of pleading are designed ultimately to
develop the controversy concerning some substantive
or jurisdictional proposition either under admitted or
disputed facts. The language of the cases under thi
Code however has. been quite confused -25 and there is
good reason to avoid the use of the Code phrase ot
this subject. It is submitted that the language used
in the Federal Rule undoubtedly is more intelligible
and should be subject to less confusion than the Ian-
19. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) pp. 78-79.
20. For example, the Code States have sustained the
validity of the commot law form in the actions of debt, general
asstunipsit and trespass.
21. It has sometimes been held that a plaintiff may allege
the performance of conditions precedent in contract liabilit
and prove waiver. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 194. It
has also been held that the plaittiff may allege that the de-
fendant has done at act and prove that he is responsible under
the law of principal and agent or master and servant because
the act was done by an agent or a servant vithini tle scope
of his employment. Clark Code Pleading (1928) pp. 161-162.
22. Rules 8 (a) and (e).
2.3. Moore's Federal Practice (1938) pp. 546-556.
2-4. See infra note 2 and text in that coniection.
25. Clark. Code Pleading (1928), pp. 75-87.
370 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL
guage of the Code and that its adoption should result
in a considerable clarification of the situation.
Likewise the attempted avoidance of the necessity
for a distinction between "operative facts" and "legal
conclusions" is a desirable objective. In the light of
the liberal provisions ol amendments and the statutes
requiring the disregard of procedural defects and the
decision of a case on the merits the general proposi-
tion that the parties are required to develop by written
pleading an issue to be disposed of in each case be-
comles simply a starting point and it has only a prima
facie application. All attempts to give conclusive ef-
fect to the general proposition have failed because of
the common feeling that the parties deserve a decision
on the merits of their claims and should not be ad-
versely affected by their own and their attorneys' mis-
takes during the pleading state of the trial. As stated
above people (including some lawyers) have felt for
a long time that excommunication or death is too se-
vere a penalty for a violation of the rules of pleading.
The result has been that parties no longer are
entitled to rely upon the written pleadings as finally
determining the issues and the decision of a case and
that one who has so relied finds that amendments and
the disregard of pleadings both as to form and sub-
stance make the reliance an unjustifiable mistake. One
who has wished to be sure of the exact position of the
adverse party has been compelled to use other methods
of ascertaining the facts which may be in issue in the
trial of a case. The Federal Rules take cognizance of
this situation and are based upon the theory that there
is only prima facie validity to the proposition that the
exact issues in a case are to be determined by the
pleadings. Elaborate and liberal provision is made for
discovery and there is good reason to abandon the
theory that the exact facts can be disclosed by written
pleadings.
The Rules are therefore designed to compel a
party to be content with a rather general statement in
the pleadings and to afford a means to the parties of
ascertaining the exact facts involved in the claims of
the adverse party by other means. It is clear
from the language of the Federal Rules and the forms
which accompany them that a party is permitted under
the Federal Rules to plead in a form which in a good
many instances would be condemned under the Code
as insufficient because the pleading was in the form
of a legal conclusion. 2' Thus on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim the form of the complaint
is largely immaterial and the party's remedy is a mo-
tion to make more specific or action under the rules
on discovery.2 7 It is believed that experience has dem-
onstrated that the general theory of the Code on this
score expressed a vain hope and that the most effec-
tive means of a party being apprised of his adversary's
exact position is not by written pleadings designed to
state all of the essential facts. On this score the Code
failed in its purpose and the actual practice never con-
formed to the intended results. The framers of the
Federal Rules, therefore, exercised a wise discretion
in taking cognizance of that fact. As a practical mat-
ter the results will be much the same, although a great
deal of confusion and wasted effort will be avoided.
What has been said above is not disturbed by
the obvious purpose of Rule 8 (b) to revert to the
earlier Code practice in some States which undertook
to abolish the general issue and to require the defend-
26. Moore's Federal Practice (1938), pp. 546-556.
27. Ibid; pp. 654-657.
ant to admit or deny specific allegations.2  It must
be conceded again that written pleadings may properly
be used to define the prima facie issues in a case and
to tle extent that they can be used to narrow the issues
they serve a very useful function. It must be remem-
bered again however that under the rules on amend-
ments and the disregard of procedural defects the posi-
tion taken by a defendant in his answer does not at all
finally determine the position which he may take on
the trial of the case and that the issues thus produced
simply have prima facie validity.
One of the most troublesome problems in the field
of pleading has been in connection with the determi-
nation of the dividing line between the burden of plead-
ing and proof which was to be assigned to the plain-
tiff and that which was to be assigned to the defendant.
The common law rules on the subject were developed
over a long period of time with the result that his-
torical accident and the growth of the substantive com-
mon law had considerable bearing upon the final re-
sults. The Code rules on this subject were of the
most general character. One rule imposed the bur-
den upon a plaintiff of stating "the facts constitutiig
his cause of action" in a complaint. Another rule re-
quired the defendant to either deny or admit the plain-
tiff's allegations and to plead any "new matter con-
stituting a defense." A further rule made provision
for avoiding the defense by the assertion of "new mat-
ter" in a reply. The Code, however, made no sugges-
tion whatever as to what constituted "new matter"
with the result that the Code provisions were adminis-
ered pretty much in the light of the common law prece-
dents. Thus while in terms the complaint statute re-
quires the plaintiff to plead all of the facts pertinent
to his claim, it has been interpreted as requiring him
to plead merely a prima facie claim. "New matter"
has been construed to be facts which under the com-
mon law rules were to be pleaded by a plea of con-
fession and avoidance.29
On this problem the Federal Rules have not in
any sense departed from the Code and common law
systems. Rule 7 (a) prohibits a reply unless the con-
sent of the court is obtained but Rule 8 (d) follows
the comnimon Code provision that affirmative allegations
to which no respective pleading is required "shall be
taken as denied or avoided." Rule 8 (c) recites a num-
ber of situations where an affirmative defense is ac-
quired. There has been some disagreement in the
cases upon some of the matters recited although most
of them have been subject to a common rule. For
example the burden of pleading and proof on the ques-
tion of contributory negligence has been the subject of
varying rules.3 0 Rule 8 (c) designates it as an affirma-
tive defense in all cases and there is considerable ad-
vantage in having a uniform rule upon the subject. In
conclusion however the Rule reverts to precedent stat-
ing that a party shall set forth affirmatively "any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense."
While the Rule in this form leaves open a rather
difficult problem in some cases it is believed that under
Rule 16 an effective means is furnished of meeting
the difficulty." For example, it is to be assumed that
the accepted rule would be applied which imposes upon
the plaintiff the burden of pleading and proving con-
28. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 392-394.
29. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 415-426.
30. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 425.
31. Rule 16 provides for a pre-trial procedure in the dis-
cretion of the court.
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ditions precedent in contract and statutory liabilities
and the burden of pleading and proving conditions sub-
sequent upon the defendant. In a given case in the
absence of controlling precedent it is quite impossible
for the parties to determine prior to the trial of the
case what the court will hold on this subject. 2 If pro-
ceedings were had however under Rule 16 the matter
might effectively be settled prior to the trial of the
case.
Rule 8 (e) (2) includes a desirable liberalization
and clarification of the rules on alternative, hypotheti-
cal, and inconsistent pleadings. As to the first two the
question is entirely one of form because it has been
1permissible for a party to plead in the alternative and
hypothetically if the repugnant or inconsistent alle-
gations were contained in separate paragraphs of the
pleadings.3 3 The same thing was true as to inconsis-
tent pleadings where the inconsistency involved was
in the factual situations asserted and not in the legal
interests impliedly asserted.3 4 The difficulty with the
Code rule on this latter point was that it required a
party to make an election upon a debatable proposi-
tion and to determine in advance in the light of the
possible evidence in the case which of two inconsistent
legal interests the court or jury would decide the party
had. Some of the Codes at least did not include this
restriction and the repudiation of the result ought to
be accepted as a desirable liberalization of the rules of
pleading.
While in form Rule 113 4  might seem to be some-
thing of an innovation the Rule in fact does not state
any new law. While it is common practice for plead-
ings to be signed in the name of a partnership of law-
yers such a practice is undesirable and may fairly be
said to be improper. There is no recognition of a
partnership entity so far as attorneys are concerned
and there is good reason to require the pleadings to
be signed by the individuals actually representing the
party. The cases have consistently held that a lawyer
is guilty of misconduct if he files a pleading without a
reasonable expectation that the allegations can be
proved or where he takes advantage of procedure for
the purpose of delay. He may be disciplined for such
misconduct and the conduct is also contempt of court.3"
It is true nevertheless that the accepted rules on this
subject are very commonly violated with impunity and
that trial judges have not always been very active in
the enforcement of the rules. If the courts themselves
promulgate a specific rule on the subject in the form
of the Federal Rule the result ought to be that the
courts would feel a more serious obligation resting
upon them to enforce the rules and attorneys might
take more seriously their obligations on this subject.
Rule 13 makes several significant changes in the
field of counterclaims and set-offs and among other
things obviates the necessity of any distinction between
counterclaims, set-offs, and cross-complaints. In gen-
eral the Code rules on this subject allowed a counter-
32. While generally the position which parties have taken
in their pleadings is binding upon them in the trial of the case,
it has generally been held on this point that the burden of
proof is determined by what the pleading should have been
rather than what they are. This is a necessary result of the
rule that the sufficiency of the complaint as a substantive matter
is open on the trial. See, Rule 12 (h).
33. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 314-316.
34. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 305-306.
34a. This rule penalizes an attorney who does not use
good faith and due care in filing a pleading.
35. Cannon's Professional Ethics, American Bar Assn.
No. 30; Matter of Tinney, 187 App. Div. 569, 176 N. Y. S. 102(1919); Rapolie, Contempt (1884) Sec. 29.
claim if: (a) the claim presented arose out of the
same transaction as the plaintiff's claim or was con-
nected with the subject-matter of that claim; (b) was
asserted in favor of the defendants against the plain-
tiffs; (c) diminished or defeated the plaintiff's recov-
ery.3" The set-off normally was available only if the
plaintiff's claim and the defendant's claim were both
in contract and the parties were the same. 7 It was
not permissible for a defendant to assert a claim against
a co-defendant or against less than all of the plaintiffs
in favor of less than all of the defendants.3 8 It was
held, however, that the express Code provisions were
not exclusive and equitable counterclaims and set-offs
were recognized and the equitable cross-bill or cross-
complaint was also recognized." Under these latter
cases a good many of the restrictions which the code
imposed were as a practical matter disregarded. While
on its face Rule 13 constitutes a very considerable
liberalization of the Code rules on the subject the Rule
really states much of the existing practice when one
considers the Code provisions in the light of the equi-
table exceptions.
Rule 13 (b) allows the filing of a counterclaim
upon any claim which the defendant has against the
plaintiff. Rule 13 (a) requires the filing of such a
claim if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject-matter of the plaintiff's claim. A
counterclaim available under this provisions which was
not asserted would be barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.40 A permissive counterclaim under (b)
might not be barred if not asserted. 4' While on the
face of it again this matter seems to constitute a seri-
ous modification of the existing law, there is some
recent authority for the proposition that a counterclaim
which might have been asserted is barred if not as-
serted.
42
Subdivision (c) makes clear what was somewhat
uncertain under the Code that a counterclaim need not
diminish or defeat the plaintiff's claim. 43 Subdivision
(e) would constitute a modification of the Code rule
which normally limited a set-off to one which the de-
fendant had acquired or which had matured at the
time the plaintiff brought his action.4 4 Rule 13 (a),
(g), and (h) removes the former restrictions in the
codes as to counterclaims and set-offs as between
parties on the same side of the case and in favor of or
against less than all of the parties. 45 (i) covers a point
which was similarly treated in the state practice.4 6
It is a fair commentary again on Rule 13 that the
results under it are not substantially different from the
results which might be obtained under the code proce-
dure as supplemented by the equitable doctrines on the
subject. The restrictions in the Code sought to give
effect to a general policy against the trial of matters
which were unrelated factually or in which less than
all of the parties involved were legally interested. The
Federal Rules accept this same policy because although
they in form permit a very broad basis for the asser-
tion of claims without factual similarity or common
36. Clark, Code Pleading 1928), pp. 441-450.
37. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 445-446.
38. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 463-472.
39. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pD. 471, 472.
40. Moore's Federal Practice (1938), pp. 680-691.
41. Moore's Federal Practice (1938), pp. 692-700.
42. Holman v. Tiosevig, 136 Wash. 261, 239 P. 545(1925) ; Note, 39 Har. L. Rev. 658 (1926) ; Notes by Advisory
Committee p. 14: Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 447.
43. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 448-450.
44. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 461-462.
45. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 463-472.
46. 64 C. J. pp. 37-41.
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legal interests, they make express provision in Rule
13 (i) and Rule 42 (b) for an eective means of deal-
ing with the subject of trial convenience and separate
judgments. It seems apparent that the Federal form
is preferable in that it deals with the problem of trial
convenience as such in each case and avoids the at-
tempt to deal with trial convenience in a general form
in terms of permissible pleadings.
It will be noted that the *'transaction" clause in
Rule 13 (a) does not follow exactly the usual language
in the Code.- The Code nornially allowed a counter-
claim if "it arose out of the samne transaction as the
plaintiff's claim or was connected with the subject-
matter" thereof, whereas the Federal Rule requires the
counterclaim to be pleaded if "it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter
of the opposing party's claim." Cases under the Code
held that a claim might be connected with the subject-
matter of the action although it did not arise out of
the same transaction.4" Under the Federal Rule such
a claim would be a permissive and not a compulsory
counterclaim. The "same transaction" clause in the
Code has caused considerable difficulty although the
accepted interpretation at the present time is fairly
well settled. Earlier cases restricting "transaction" to
a "business transaction" have been repudiated and sub-
stantially it is settled that claims arise out of the same
transaction when they have substantially the same fac-
tual background. 49 The proper test would seem to be
this: would proof of the plaintiff's claim involve evi-
dence which to any substantial extent would be mate-
rial to the proof of the defendant's claim. Apparently
the addition in the Federal Rule "or occurrence" was
designed to repudiate the "business transaction" inter-
pretation of the Code phrase. It may be that the addi-
tion is not entirely a fortunate one for the implication
of its addition is that there is some distinction between
"a transaction" and "an occurrence." Something could
be said for tile omission of this language or its use to
the exclusion "the transaction."
The Federal Rule does not expressly repudiate
the Code cases interpreting the phrase "arising out o"'
the same transaction as requiring that the plaintiff's
cause of action come into existence at a time prior to
the defendant's cause of action. 5  Most States, how-
ever, have at least by implication repudiated this in-
terpretation and it can be assumed that the phrase was
used in its commonly accepted meaning."
Rule 1452 would constitute an innovation in most
States. The change it would make in the usual prac-
tice so far as counterclaims are concerned has been
pointed out above. It is in keeping with the subse-
quent rules on parties and the joinder of actions which
repudiate the formal common law and Code restric-
tions on these subjects. The Rule permits an asser-
tion by the defendant against a third party of a claim
in which the plaintiff may not be interested where the
defendant is interested in the third party being bound
by the judgment in the case."
47. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 451.
48. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 454, n. 80.
49. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 454, 455.
50. Adams v. Schwartz, 137 App. Div. 230, 122 N. Y. S.
41 (1910; McCargar v. Wiley, 112 Ore. 215, 229 P. 665
(10924).
51. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 441-457.
52. This rule provides for "third party practice."
53. As a general rule the Code does not go as far as
the Federal Rule although there is some State recognition of
the substance of this Rule. See, Moore's Federal Practice
(1938), pp. 736-782.
Rule 1S in general does not depart seriously from
the present Code provisions oil the subject of amend-
ments. It restricts ail amendment as a matter of course
to a time before a responsive pleading is served or if
none is permitted to a time twenty days thereafter.
After a responsive pleading is served amendments are
permitted only by leave of court. Subdivision (b)
makes express provision for a so-called non-paper is-
sue and this does not depart from tile accepted practice
where this result is reached because of the statutes
which require a decision on tihe inerits of the case or
trnder a statutory or common law rule to tie effect
that procedural defects mav. be waived by a failure to
make proper Ohjections.5 4  Under this Rule a formal
amendment may be made but this is not necessary.
Thus evidence which is not within the paper issues
may be admitted under an amendment and tile privi-
lege of the adverse party is largely that of asking for
a continuance. Earlier statutes oil amendments were
somewhat restricted in their terms, but in a number
of states the present law is in conformity with this
Rule.15
Subdivision (c) is designed to effect a change in
the law on the relation back of amendments. Normally
no statutory provision has made an express statement
on this subject, but usually as against every objection
except tile statute of limitations it has been held that
an amended pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading."5  This Rule, however, is designed
to change that result so that the amended pleading if
it has a factual connection with tile original pleading
does relate back so as to defeat the statute of limita-
tiolls.'
Rule 16," of course, constitutes (in form) an in-
novation on this subject for most States. Although
certainly under the Code there was no prohibition
against a trial judge proceeding in this manner. It will
be noted, however, that the procedure is permissive
and not compulsory and therefore actually would not
constitute any modification of the Code system. A
great deal has been written in favor of this rule and
there is considerable data tending to show its effec-
tiveness as a workable proposition. 9
Rule 17 (a) follows almost verbatim the usual
code provision on this subject. The first part of the
rule states the common law and Code requirement on
the point. It has always been true that the plaintiff
in an action had to establish the fact that he was the
legal owner of the interest which he was seeking to
assert against the defendant. If he is the legal owner
he is the real party in interest (meaning "legal inter-
est"). Thus it has always been true that a possessory
action could be defeated by showing that the plaintiff
did not have a possessory interest in the property in-
volved. It made no difference that he had some in-
terest in the property. 5 For the same reason one of
two promisees could not maintain an action for the
breach of the contract because the ownership of the
interest was not in him but in an entity composed of
54. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 368-370; pp. 496-522.
55. Ibid.
56. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 513-516.
57. Moore's Federal Practice (1938), pp. 798-802.
58. This rule provides for a "pre-trial procedure."
59. See the articles and materials referred to in Notes
of the Advisory Committee, pp. 16, 17.
60. For example, it has been as true under the Code as
at common law that the owner of an equitable interest in
property may not maintain a common law action for posses-
sion. See, Clark, Code Pleadings (1928), pp. 114-115.
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himself and the other promnisees. 6' For the same rea-
son one could not sue to recover damages for personal
injuries to another person. 2  The test in all of these
cases is as to the legal ownership of the rights sought
to be asserted. Rather curiously the Rule allows as
does the Code rule "a person with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of an-
other" to sue although it is also true that the bene-
ficiary or principal may sue under the first provision
of the rule."' Something could be said for the omis-
sion of this provision but at the same time the inter-
pretation of it is so well settled that its inclusion can
do no particular harm.
Rule 17 (b) already has caused some difficulty.
The first sentence repudiates the accepted conflict of
laws rule on this subject, but a great deal can be said
in its favor. The second sentence is the one which
has caused some concern. It has been asserted b the
Rules Committee that it was designed primarily to
give effect to valid restrictions on actions against gov-
ernmental corporations and that the Rule was intended
to deal with the question of corporate capacity to sue
or be sued as an original proposition. 4 In the present
form the Rule so far as the Federal courts are con-
cernecd is not objectionable. In a State system the
Rule might raise some doubt as to the continued valid-
ity of statutory restrictions against foreign corporations
and if adoptecl in the State practice this point should
receive some attention.
Under Rule 17 (b) when the plaintiff is suing in
a representative capacity his capacity is governed by
the law of the state in which the District Court is held.
This is in accord with the accepted rule so that unless
a State has removed the common law restrictions
against actions by foreign officers, an action may not
be maintained itunler this rule by a foreign adininistra-
tor, guardian. etc. The last part of this sentence it has
been asserted is an attempt to give effect to the case
of United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal
Co." and similar cases. It is suggested that a general
rule which would allow a partnership or other unin-
corporated corporation to sue or be sued in its con-
mon name would be a very desirable rule.6 A good
mail% States as a matter of fact already have a rule of
this character. 7
The first sentence of Rule 17 (c)"6 might con-
stitute a modification of the law in some states. It is
not always true that a guardian, for example. may
maintain or defend an action for an infant or an in-
sane person. There are distinctions between guard-
ians of the person and property and sometimes even a
general guardian under the statutes involved has no
legal interest in some of his ward's personal and prop-
ertv rights. 3  The Federal Rule seems to be a very
desirable provision ol this subject and its adoption
61. Clark, Code Pleading (192S). p. 131.
62. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 94.
63. Clark. Code Pleading (1928), pp. 112. 113: 128-130.
64. Hearings Before House Committee. pp. 18-22: 66.
65. 259 U. S. 344 (1922) Hearings Before House Coin-
mittee, p. 21, 22.
66. The Rule that partners must sue or be sued in their
individual names results in unnecessary hardship in the prose-
cution of some cases. It is to be doubted that a rule consti-
tutionally could provide that service of process upon one indi-
vidual partner would be valid service of process upon tihtbalance. If the partnership is classified as an entity fr the
purposes of litigation this difficulty is avoided.
67. Clark. Code Pleading (1928). pp. 11-3..
68. This rule provides for actions by or against a rep-
resentative of an incompetent person.
69. Pomeroy's Code Remedies (1929) Sec. 110.
Would remove a good deal of difficulty in the state
practice in this type of situation. The latter part of
Rule 17 (c) is in conformity with the usual practice.'-
When read in the light of the rules oil the joinder
of parties, Rule 18 (a) renmoves the common law and
Code restrictions oil the joinder of actions. The Code
rules on the suject are just about as arbitrary as the
common law rules -' They made arbitrary classifica-
tions of actions and provided that claims falling vithin
each classification might be joined.72  There was, how-
ever, al additional provision that claims "arising out
of the same transaction or connected with tile same
subject of the action" might be joined. Again as in
the cotnterclainm rule there was confusion in the cases"
and the substantial policy favored the joinder of claims
where it might be expected that they could be tried
profitably at the same time. Again the Federal Rule
reaches this result. but it does so by providing for anl
tnlimited joinder itl the first instance taking care of
the matter of trial convenience by the rules as to the
separate trials of multiple issues.
The difference is one of form. Under the Code
lprocedure actions which were iiisjoined vere not dis-
miissed, but were docketed as separate actions if a
proper motion or denuirrer raising the pIoint was filed.
74
The plaintiff might then quite properly make a motion
to consolidate the actions for the purposes of trial.
If the actions were filed separatelv in the first instance,
again the motion to consolidate for trial was an ac-
cepted procedure." The practice. therefore, under the
Code was that if there was any substantial reason why
actions ought to he tried at the same time they could
be dealt with oil that basis. Those which might have
been properly joined and for which there was no ad-
vantage in a joint trial could be separated for trial.
As in the counte'clail rules the Federal Rules attack
Slie prollem in a more desirable form. There is ilo
particular advantaee in quarreling about the joinder of
actions. The real prollem is as to whether or not
several claims ought to he tried together atd it seems
%vise to deal with the problem in those terms.
It will be noted that as distinguished from the
counterclaim rules there is ilo designation of actions
which must be joined aild those where joinder is per-
missive. The Federal Rules. therefore, do not under-
take to deal expressly with the problem of the results
under the law of res judicala if the plaintiff does not
take advantage of the provision for joinder of actions.
fin view of the fact that there is considerable authority
for the proposition that a judgment is res judicata not
only as to what was actually litigated, but also as to
matters which imight have been litigated, including
separate causes of actions which iight have been
joined.Y an attorney should certainl' hesitate to take
advantage of the apparent permissive feature of Rtle
IS (a). Rule 18 (b) finds its counterpart in a good
mailre, of the Code states atlld is designed to repudiate
tle older rule which required a claim to be reduced
to jucgment before the creditor could successfully
70. 14 R. C. L. pp. 279-290.
71. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 300.
72. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 298-311.
73. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 308-311.74. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 316-31.
75. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 333-33..
76. Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 190 Ind. 444, 129 N. E.
8.3 (1921) : King v. C. M. & St. P. R. R. 80 Minn. 83, 82
N. W. 1113 (1900) : 35 Michigan Law Rev. 327 (1936);
9 Wise. Law Rev. 204 (1934); 8 Brooklyn Law Rev. 224(1928) ; 47 A. L. R. 529.
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maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance."
In general Rules 19 and 20 are in accord with
the usual Code rules on this subject. The real party
in interest rule proceeds on the theory that there is
but one person legally interested in the claim sought
to be asserted. But just as several persons may be
jointly or commonly or in some other manner inter-
ested in the same property so several persons may be
jointly, or in common or in some other manner in-
terested in a primary or secondary right which may
be the subject of a civil action arising out of the owner-
ship of property or the making or performance of con-
tracts. The rule, therefore, has always been (at least
where there has been a common or joint interest in
such an interest) that the persons thus interested
should join in an action asserting the right."8 On the
other hand more than one person may be responsible
jointly or in common with another because he is a
party to a promise with others or under the doctrines
of joint or concurrent action he is legally responsible
for the conduct of another."8 The results under the
Code rules in general were no different from the re-
sults at common law because the substantive law in-
volved has been not materially changed. The Code in
ternss did not require a strictly joint or common legal
interest 0 and the Federal Rules specifically elaborate
on this proposition. Thus it has been held that a life
tenant and a remainderman might join in an action for
injury to their property.8 ' Persons not strictly jointly
interested in the performance of a promise might like-
wise join.8 2 Persons who had legal and equitable in-
terest in the same property might join83 In all of
those instances there was no common law precedent
for the joinder.
Under the Code also there was in the equitable
cases a concept of joint action subjecting several de-
fendants to a common liability for an equitable tort
which went beyond the common law concept of joint
action.8
4
The Federal Rules require the joinder of plaintiff
and defendants if there is a joint interest and as indi-
cated above this does not in the slightest depart from
the common law or Code rules on the subject. The
significant innovation on the subject of parties is in
Rule 20 (a) which allows a joinder even although the
interest asserted is several or in the alternative, pro-
vided the claims asserted arise out of the same trans-
action or occurrence and if a common question of law
and fact will arise in the action. The same thing is
provided as to the joinder of defendants. This really
allows a joinder of actions and is a direct repudiation
of the Code requirement that actions joined affect all
of the parties to the action. 5 The Rule recognizes
the inadvisability of compelling one party to partieipate
in the litigation of a claim in which he has no actual
interest and allows the joinder otdy if the actions
joined involve the same factual and legal background
so that there is some advantage in trying the actions
together. The Rule reaches the further very desirable
77. Notes by Advisory Committee, pp. 19, 20.
78. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 242; 250, 251.
79. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 257-259; 264, 265.
80. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 250.
81. Schiffer v. City of Eau Claire, 51 Wisc. 385, 8 N. W.
253 (1881).
82. Home Insurance Company of New York v. Gilnan,
112 Ind. 7, 13 N. E. 118 (1887).
83. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 110.
84. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 266.
85. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 268, 269.
result that situations involving doubt as to the sepa-
rate rights and liabilities of the parties as between them-
selves and as against each other may be determined in
one proceeding although again provision is made for
separate trials if that is desirable in a given case.
The last sentence of Rule 20 (a) is a counterpart
of a similar provision in most Codes and constitutes a
repudiation of the common law rule to the effect that
there could be but one judgment in one case and that
it was not permissible to determine the interest of
parties on the same side of the case as between them-
selves.8 6 Thus clearly it would be permissible for a
life tenant and a remainderman to join in an action
for injury to property and to apportion the amount
of damages recovered as between the plaintiffs.
Rule 21 in substance is in accord with the com-
mon Code provision on this subject which in turn
repudiates the common law rules on the subject. At
common law it was not permissible to render a judg-
ment in favor of one plaintiff and against another plain-
tiff nor against one defendant or in favor of another
defendant except in those cases where liability was
both joint and several.8 7 The result of Rule 21, par-
ticularly in the light of the last sentence of Rule 20
(a), is that misjoinder of parties in the sense that there
have been too many parties joined does not adversely
affect the case so far as the parties who are properly
joined are concerned. If there is a non-joinder of
necessary parties the usual result was that the action
was decided adversely against the plaintiff."" Rule
21 undertakes to change this result and to require that
the omitted parties be brought in. Normally under
the Code practice a plaintiff could have reached this
result by asking leave to make the proper amendments
although a court might properly refuse such an amend-
ment because of the consequent delay. 8 9 Rule 21 in
terms gives the trial court no discretion on this point
and the plaintiff no discretion and it is incumbent on
the court to see that the proper parties are added.
Rule 22 goes beyond the usual Code provision on
interpleader. The Code normally provided simply for
the assertion of an interpleader as an affirmative equi-
table defense. 0 It was usually held that the original
bill of interpleader was still an available remedy.8 ' The
Federal Rule removes some of the restrictions on this
subject and liberalizes the practice. 2
Rule 23 deals with a subject which was covered
in rather ambiguous terms in the Code." It is de-
signed to remove the admitted ambiguities. It is be-
lieved, however, that under the Federal Rule substan-
tiallv the same results will be reached as were reached
in the usual interpretation of the code provisions.
94
Rule 24 simply extends the rules on the joinder of
parties and claims to an omitted party giving such a
person the privilege of intervening. In substance the
Rule does not depart from the Code rule. 5 It will be
noted that the Rule takes cognizance of the Federal
statutes requiring a government defense in an action
(Continued on page 435)
86. Moore's Federal Practice (1938), pp. 2165-2186.
87. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 262.
88. This was particularly true in the cases involving joint
contract liability in the absence, of course, of a proper amend-
ment.
89. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 509-511.
90. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), p. 292.
91. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (1919). Sec. 1329.
92. Notes by Advisory Committee, pp. 21, 22.
93. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 276-282.
94. Notes by Advisory Committee, pp. 22-24.
95. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), pp. 287-290.
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tions that baffle most of our educated people and that
must be reconciled if a humanistic civilization is to
survive.
VICTOR S. YARROS
Lewis Institute, Chicago
NEW FEDERAL RULES AND STATE
PROCEDURE
(Continued from page 374)
between private persons testing the constitutionality
of a Federal statute. A similar rule would certainly
be desirable in the state courts when the constitution-
ality of a statute or an ordinance is involved.
Rule 25 states the substance of the Code rule on
the substitution of parties and the effect of a transfer
of interest while an action is pending."5 It is not per-
ceived that the adoption of this rule in the state prac-
tice would materially alter the accepted practice on this
subject.
INTRODUcToRY NoTE: In the course of this article it is
necessary to make a large number of general statements on the
subject of state procedure and the new Federal Rules. It has
been thought undesirable to undertake an exhaustive citation
of authorities for those statements. A number of references will
be made to the Notes to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States prepared by the Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure published in March,
19.8. These notes have been published in a number of other
publications. In order to conserve space the reference made
in this article will be to the "Notes by Advisory Committee."
References will also be made to the hearings before the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives in
connection with the consideration by that Committee of the
lederal Rules of Civil Procedure. To conserve space this
publication will be referred to as "Hearings before House
Committee."'
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
(Continued from page 399)
ministrative agencies in such widely different matters
as the running of stockyards, the determination of dis-
putes in employer and employee relationships, transpor-
tation in interstate commerce, compliance with the laws
relating to competition, radio and various other matters.
Further, in an attempt to avoid delays in securing
uniformity of judicial decision upon review, the bill pro-
vides that where a reviewing court disagrees with an-
other court in a similar case, the disagreeing court
must forthwith certify the points of disagreement to the
Supreme Court of the United States in accordance with
the procedure now existing by law for certified ques-
tions. We anticipate that many months will be saved
in getting the conflicting decisions to the Supreme Court
for final determination. No one seems to have objected
to this provision but I think it well to mention it.
There is another bill before the Congress which
is, in a sense, a rival to our bill. That bill would estab-
lish a Court of Administration in Washington to take
over the jurisdiction now exercised by the eleven Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal and the three judge statutory
district courts over many causes of controversy between
the administrative agencies and the individual. This
court could sit as individual judges and it is contem-
plated by the bill that these judges travel around over
the country as the needs may require. The scope of
review would be much more limited than that stated
in our bill. I have not the time to further discuss the
96. 47 C. J. pp. 157-167.
bill except to say that the Boston meeting of the Asso-
ciation in 1937 rejected a similar proposal and this Com-
mittee is opposed to the bill.
Gentlemen, I have trespassed dreadfully upon your
time today. I have not attempted to explain the entire
administrative law bill as some provisions therein ap-
pear not to be questioned. I think you may readily see
that the American Bar bill presents the eternal conflict
between two different theories of government: one,.the
American theory of a tri-partite government, each part
a check upon the other two and none overbalancing the
others. The other, the parliamentary theory of govern-
ment, in which the executive, for the time being, is the
dominating force and its adoption here could but result
in forcing the acceptance of the Roman theory in which
the executive is supreme-a reversion to the primi-
tive type of government resulting in the condition ob-
taining in Germany, Italy, 23 and Russia today.
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS: AN
EDITORIAL
(Continued from page 403)
formed observers, the Federal Courts of today
and recent years are as free of "politics and
patronage," and are as worthy of general pub-
lic respect and confidence, as at any time in
our history. Certainly in its record of ad-
ministrative efficiency, devotion to the funda-
mentals of justice and fair play, and imparti-
ality in the discharge of duties between man
and man, the judicial branch of government
has not fallen behind the executive or legisla-
tive departments.
During the past six years, the personnel
of the Courts of the United States has been
largely reconstituted. We think that today,
as before, the people of the United States
should justly hold their judicial officers in high
repute, as bulwarks of liberty according to
law. During the past six years, many of the
appointments to judicial office have been ad-
mirable; a few have seemed to be regrettable.
In this respect, the experience of other years
is unchanged. For all efforts to eliminate
"politics and patronage" and elevate experi-
ence and courage as the tests of judicial selec-
tion, the Bar will continue to applaud the suc-
cesses and lament the failures.
The Attorney General of the United
States has an unrivalled opportunity to set his
face like flint against the selection of judges
for any reasons other than proven ability, ex-
erience, courage, judicial temperament, inde-
pendence, and fidelity to the American form of
government.
23. Associated Press despatch from Rome published on
page 1, New York Time for November 14, 1936 stated that:
"Abolition of all civil and criminal courts in Italy has been
decided upon by Premier Benito Mussolini, official sources dis-
closed today. The courts will be replaced by special boards or
committees from various divisions of the corporate state, these
sources declared. . . . under the new system lawyers would
become government functionaries the same as judges and other
employees."
